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Abstract: The present study explores the processing of temporal information in 
event knowledge by focusing on the transition from an earlier, source state to a 
later, goal state. Participants were presented with an event verb followed by ant-
onymous adjectives or adverbs denoting an earlier state and a later state. The 
states were presented either chronologically (to cook: cold – hot) or inversely (to 
cook: hot – cold) with regard to the denoted event. Participants were asked to 
identify either the earlier or the later state. We found that later states are identi-
fied faster and more accurately than earlier states. Later states presented chrono-
logically were identified even more quickly than later states presented inversely. 
We attribute our results to the fact that directedness towards the goal state is a 
general principle of cognition which plays a fundamental role in language and in 
simulation, whereby language processing provides faster and more direct access 
to goals even than simulation.
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1 Introduction
Events are denoted by verbs, and the comprehension of event verbs has often 
been used as a means of investigating event knowledge in psychology (e.g., Alt-
mann and Kamide 1999, 2007; Chatterjee et al. 1999; Ferretti et al. 2001; McRae et 
al. 2001). Processing a verb activates an event schema in which slots for thematic 
roles (or thematic relations) are opened up which are occupied by the persons 
and objects participating in the event (see Fillmore 1968; Hare et al. 2009; Lin and 
Murphy 2001; McRae et al. 1997). It has been shown that typical persons and ob-
jects and their thematic roles can be primed by an event verb (see, for example, 
Ferretti et al. 2001; Hare et al. 2009; McRae et al. 2005). The event verb arrest, for 
example, primes the typical agent cop. These priming effects demonstrate that 
the event schema extends to persons and objects.
The persons and objects which play the thematic roles in events are at tributed 
states which also form part of event schemas. This is demonstrated by Ferretti 
et al. (2001), who showed that the event verb trick, for instance, primes gullible. 
Since the states of persons and objects change during an event, we suggest that a 
source and a goal state (such as cold and hot in to cook) are also included in event 
knowledge. Accordingly, Altman and Kamide (2009) propose that an event re-
quires, “at a minimum, an initial state and an end state (with one or more partic-
ipants in the event undergoing some change between the initial and end states)” 
(p. 56; see also Moens and Steedman 1988). When pasta is being cooked, for ex-
ample, water will change its state from cold to hot, and the state of the person 
who eats the pasta will change from hungry to full. Cold and hungry are source 
states, hot and full are goal states. 
In this study, we investigated processing of temporal information of events. In 
a temporal judgment task, participants had to decide either which one of two pre-
sented event states was the earlier state or which one of the two presented event 
states was the later state within a given event. To this end, participants were pre-
sented with an event verb followed by two antonymous adjectives or adverbs 
which respectively denoted the earlier (source) and later (goal) state of the event. 
The states were presented either in chronological order (early states on the left, 
late states on the right side on the screen; e.g., to cook: cold – hot) or in inverse 
order (late states on the left, early states on the right; e.g., to cook: hot – cold). 
1.1  Simulation and language processing of events
One view of embodied cognition states that perceptual experiences are captured 
in association areas. When mentally processing these experiences, they are par-
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tially reenacted in the same overlapping neural tissue in which they were origi-
nally experienced (see the theory of perceptual symbol systems; Barsalou 1999). 
The resulting simulations are structured in the same way as the perceptual expe-
rience itself, and this may account for iconic representation (Barsalou calls per-
ceptual symbols analogical, 1999: 578). Evidence of iconic representation is found 
in the study by Zwaan and Yaxley (2003) in which the spatial orientation of words 
on a screen was manipulated. The words, which denoted parts of objects such as 
attic and basement, were either presented iconically to their positions (attic was 
presented above basement), or inversely to their positions in the object (attic pre-
sented below basement). Participants were asked to judge whether the words 
were semantically related. Words in iconic positions were easier to identify as 
being semantically related than words in inverse positions.
When Louwerse (2008) re-analyzed the study by Zwaan and Yaxley (2003), 
he showed that the ease with which words positioned iconically on a screen (attic 
above basement) are processed as compared to words positioned inversely (attic 
below basement) is not just a direct effect of simulation, as Zwaan and Yaxley in-
terpreted it to be, but may also be explained by a linguistic variable, namely the 
frequency of word order in language (the iconic order attic – basement is more 
frequent than the inverse order basement – attic). Louwerse (2008) concluded 
that relationships in language often serve as “a useful symbolic shortcut to em-
bodied meaning” (p. 843; see also Louwerse 2007). We hasten to add that the fact 
that the more frequent word order mirrors iconically the spatial arrangement of 
object parts in reality is (probably) a result of the simulation retained in language. 
Accordingly, recent discussion has centered around a possible interaction be-
tween amodal and embodied cognition (e.g., Barsalou et al. 2008; Mahon and 
Caramazza 2008; Markman and Dietrich 2000).
In the language and situated simulation theory (LASS theory), for instance, 
Barsalou et al. (2008) propose that there are two systems of conceptual process-
ing, a linguistic system and a situated simulation system. The two interact during 
conceptual processing, but one system dominates depending on the demands of 
the task. Barsalou et al. (2008) claim that only simulation permits access to the 
deep meaning of a concept, while the linguistic system processes concepts super-
ficially (e.g., on word associations) and, thus, faster. When the linguistic system 
fails to suffice, the simulation system takes over and becomes dominant. This 
theory is supported by the results of a property verification task set by Solomon 
and Barsalou (2004) in which participants were asked to decide whether a prop-
erty was part of an object or not (e.g., is tusk a property of an elephant?). Perfor-
mance was mainly affected by perceptual variables of the properties such as size, 
salience and so on (i.e., variables which require processing in the simulation sys-
tem). The tusk of an elephant, for instance, is larger than the nose of a fox. As a 
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result, it takes longer to simulate and to verify it as a property of an elephant. In 
case of hasty responses, this process is also more erroneous. 
Reaction times (RTs) and error rates indicating simulation of the properties of 
the object were only observed, however, when participants were presented in ad-
dition to actual properties with false properties that were highly associated 
with the objects in question (e.g., owl – tree). When participants were presented 
in addition to actual properties with false properties that were not highly associ-
ated with the objects (e.g., pliers – river), a superficial, linguistic association 
strategy was employed: Participants verified actual properties when an associa-
tion with the paired object was detected – since all true part-object pairs are mod-
erately to highly associated – and rejected false properties when no association 
was detected. 
The linguistic strategy is indicated by RTs and error rates that were mainly 
affected by association strengths between the properties and the objects, but 
not by the perceptual variables. As a result, it leads to shorter RTs and fewer er-
rors to verify a strongly associated property of an object than a moderately asso-
ciated one. In contrast, where an association was perceived also between false 
properties and objects, it proved impossible to solve the verification task using 
the linguistic strategy alone, so participants resorted to mental simulation to per-
mit deeper processing. The results obtained by Solomon and Barsalou (2004) 
strongly indicate that language processing is more efficient than simulation pro-
cessing because not only were total verification times shorter but error rates were 
lower when the linguistic strategy was used. 
The LASS theory is not only supported by RTs and error rates, but also by 
fMRI studies (e.g., Kan et al. 2003; Simmons et al. 2008). Using the property veri-
fication task (i.e., the task used by Solomon and Barsalou 2004; see above), Kan 
et al. (2003) found that the left fusiform gyrus (an area which is commonly asso-
ciated with imagery processes) was activated when the property-object pairs used 
in the false trials were associated, indicating simulation processing (cf. Barsalou 
et al. 2008). However, the left fusiform gyrus was not activated when the property- 
object pairs used in the false trials were not associated, indicating that no imag-
ery processes were involved. This result demonstrates that language processing 
sufficed when the property-object pairs used in false trials were not associated. 
1.2 Goal-directed representation of events
On the basis of the LASS theory (Barsalou et al. 2008), we assumed that asking 
participants to identify either the earlier state or the later state would activate 
both the linguistic and the simulation system, but that their relative impact would 
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vary depending on the instructions received. We suggest that goals are salient in 
both systems. Focusing on the end states (goals) of events is one of life’s main 
principles. We are always trying to anticipate and predict the goals of events that 
will occur in the future. 
Language serves to reorganize our perception of events according to inten-
tions and goals (Zacks et al. 2001). Language is a means to support anticipation 
and goal-directed cognition (Zwaan 2008). When a pencil is being sharpened, for 
instance, we cannot see that the pencil has become sharp until we have finished 
rotating it in the sharpener. However, by the means of language we can infer that 
rotating the pencil serves the goal of sharpening it. That goal-directedness is a 
fundamental aspect of language is evidenced by the fact that a distinction is 
made between telic and atelic verbs – verbs that implicate an end (a goal) and 
verbs that are not biased towards an end. Telic verbs (like to build and to destroy) 
are goal-directed, as the very name suggests. Atelic verbs, on the other hand, such 
as to live and to love, don’t involve an endpoint (see Vendler 1967 and Dowty 1979) 
and thus are not goal-directed.1 
Telic verbs have a strong linguistic association with the goal state of the event 
they refer to (cf. cook – hot). We argue that this linguistic association enables 
goals to be anticipated rapidly. When participants are instructed to identify the 
later state (i.e., the goal state of an event), then, the event verbs presented on the 
screen are assumed mainly to trigger the linguistic system. Although the linguis-
tic system is also active when participants are instructed to identify the earlier 
state (after all, the stimuli are words – see the encoding specificity principle of 
Tulving and Thomson 1973; cf. also Barsalou et al. 2008), earlier event states do 
not bear such a strong linguistic association with the event verb and so cannot be 
processed effectively by the linguistic system alone. Instead, the event and its 
states have to be simulated. This process is more challenging and more time con-
suming. This is why we assumed that RTs would depend on the instructions re-
ceived, and that later states (accessed primarily via language processing) would 
be identified faster than earlier states (which are accessed primarily via simula-
tion). Because the simulation system is goal-directed too, however, we assumed 
that responses to earlier states would not only take longer but also be less accu-
rate than responses to later states. If this was the case, it could indicate a way in 
which the two systems are reconciled. 
1 This typology is fundamental in language philosophy as well as in linguistics. The line be-
tween telic verbs and atelic verbs is a fine one, but there are means of coercing verbs into telic 
and vice versa (see Moens and Steedman 1988).
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1.3 Processing chronology by simulation
Directedness towards the future also implies that the chronological order of events 
is retained in our mental representation of them (see Fig. 1). Several studies have 
shown that component events of event sequences (i.e., scripts; cf. Schank and Abel-
son 1977) are represented in chronological order (e.g., Barsalou and Sewell 1985; 
Raisig et al. 2007, 2010; van der Meer et al. 2006). Furthermore, violations of chrono-
logical order also affect memory performance in recall: Non-chronological script 
events were recalled incorrectly, with a bias towards chronological order (Bower 
et al. 1979). In line with previous findings, we expected the order in which event 
states were presented to have an effect on RTs and accuracy, with chronological pre-
sentation eliciting faster and more accurate responses than inverse presentation.
According to the embodied cognition theory, knowledge preserves the per-
ceptual and motoric properties of the represented entities iconically (e.g., Barsa-
lou 1999; Barsalou 2008; Glenberg 1997; Zwaan and Madden 2005). The simula-
tion of events should thus preserve the chronological order of event states. A 
strong linguistic association exists between event verbs and later states, which 
enables later states to be identified via language processing. Thus, we did not 
expect the order of presentation to have a significant effect in the case of later 
states. Instead, we assumed that simulation would only be required when iden-
tifying earlier states. As a result, the effect of the order in which states are pre-
sented is expected to be significant only when participants are asked to identify 
earlier states – that is, earlier states are likely to elicit faster and more accurate 
responses when presented chronologically (i.e., on the left side of the screen) 
than when they are presented inversely (i.e., on the right side of the screen).2
2 Note, that since we presented each order of adjectives both chronologically and inversely with 
regard to an event verb (cf. Table 2), an impact of temporal order cannot be attributed to directed 
associations between the antonymous adjectives. 
Fig. 1: The chronological and directed representation of events places emphasis on goals
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In line with Nuthmann and van der Meer (2005), we varied the stimulus onset 
asynchrony (SOA) between the onset of presentation of the event verb and the 
onset of presentation of the event states using intervals commonly associated 
with automatic and strategic processing (250 ms and 1000 ms). A short SOA of 
250 ms does not allow sufficient time for strategic processing in semantic priming 
paradigms (Neely 1977; cf. de Groot 1984). Nuthmann and van der Meer (2005) 
found evidences that single event representations are directed toward the goal 
state of an event. Participants had to decide whether a verb denoting an event 
(e.g., piling) was related to an adjective or participle denoting a source state of an 
object (e.g., low), or to an adjective or participle denoting a goal state of an object 
(e.g., high). Under both SOA conditions, participants were faster to verify the re-
latedness of a goal state than that of a source state. Regarding error rates, how-
ever, goal states were only responded to significantly more accurately under the 
long SOA (and not under the short SOA) suggesting that, under the long SOA, 
goal-directed representation is strengthened by the strategic prediction of goal 
states. This results in the erroneous rejection of source states as being unre-
lated. On the basis of this outcome, we used the same SOA variations to explore 
whether the SOA would affect the processing of the goal-directed representation 
of the event.
To summarize, our main hypotheses were: (a) Later states will be identified 
more quickly than earlier states independently of the order in which the states are 
presented because later states are the goals of an event and can be processed 
linguistically, whereas the identification of earlier states requires simulation pro-
cessing. (b) Earlier states will be identified less accurately than later states be-
cause in simulation processing goals are salient. (c) Earlier states presented 
chronologically will be identified faster and more accurately than earlier states 
presented inversely. (d) If the SOA variation affects the effects of instruction or 
order of presentation on RTs or error rates, this can be taken as an indication 




Thirty-eight psychology students from the Humboldt University Berlin par-
ticipated in this study. All were native German speakers. Twenty-eight were 
 female. Participants either received credit points or participated voluntarily. 
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The mean age was 24 years; SD = 6.5. We adhered to the tenets of the Helsinki 
Declaration.
2.2 Material
To create the material for the present study, we first gathered antonymous adjec-
tives or adverbs that denoted source and goal states of an event, for example, cold 
– hot. The antonyms denoted a transition in a particular direction, in this case 
from cold to hot. In the following pre-test, by pressing a ctrl-button, 20 partici-
pants (mean age 25.5, SD 3.9) judged whether the two adjectives/adverbs were 
meaningfully related or not. Mapping between the answer and the left and right 
ctrl buttons was counterbalanced between subjects. The pre-test consisted of 
50% antonymous adjectives or adverbs and 50% adjectives or adverbs without a 
semantic relationship (i.e., distracters, e.g., light – small). To control for possible 
order effects, the two adjectives/adverbs were presented in both orders (small – 
broad and broad – small). 
The meaningfully related antonyms that we had identified as adequately de-
scribing event states were next placed on two lists, appearing on each list in a 
different order (e.g., list 1 cold – hot, list 2 hot – cold). Each list was then given to 
10 participants (mean age 36.3, SD 14.28) who were asked to generate event verbs 
for each antonym pair, respecting the chronological order in which the antonyms 
were presented (e.g., it was stressed that the antonym pair small – broad could 
describe the transition of states that takes place during the events to enlarge, to 
fatten or to dilate, but not that which takes place during the events to narrow or to 
compress). Seventeen new participants (mean age 29.9, SD 8.9) ranked the events 
thus generated according to how well they fitted the antonyms describing the 
transition between event states from 1 for the best rank to higher values for lower 
ranks (depending on the number of events generated per antonym order). Those 
events with the lowest median values (i.e., the best rank) were selected for the 
present study.3
3 The verbs we selected were coerced into telic by the adjectives or adverbs which followed. One 
of the two states which participants were instructed to identify referred to the end of the event, 
ensuring that the verbs were clearly understood as telic. This was confirmed by an association 
test conducted post-hoc (see Discussion) which revealed an association strength of .71 between 
event verbs and adjectives/adverbs (or synonyms thereof) which denoted the state resulting from 
the event (goal state). The association strength between verbs and goal states was balanced 
across the orders in which the denoting antonyms were presented in the main study, t(31) = 1.16, 
p = .25, r = .2.
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Finally, each antonym pair was combined with the event verb that reflected 
the chronological order in which the antonyms were presented. To give an exam-
ple, the event verb to freeze reflects the chronological order of the antonym pair 
hot – cold, while the event verb to cook reflects the chronological order of the 
antonym pair cold – hot. By inversing the order of the antonyms and assigning 
them to the same verb, we then also created the inverse condition (e.g., to freeze: 
cold – hot; cf. Table 1). In the end we were left with a total of 64 event verbs paired 
with 32 antonym pairs that were used in both orders (e.g., to enlarge: small – 
broad and to narrow: broad – small; cf. Appendix). The study was conducted in 
German. The examples above are translations into English.
2.3 Design
Each event verb was used twice, once in connection with antonyms that denoted 
states in chronological order, once in connection with antonyms that denoted 
states in inverse order. To avoid participants being presented with the same event 
verb twice, stimuli were assigned to two lists, each containing 64 events, with 
50% of the events on each list presented in connection with chronologically or-
dered states and 50% with inversely ordered states (e.g., list 1 to cook: cold – hot, 
list 2 to cook: hot – cold). Since the same antonyms were used each time, just in a 
different order, word frequency and number of syllables were controlled for. 
The following independent variables were included in the study:
1. Instructions were a blocked factor: For one half of the stimuli (N = 32) par-
ticipants responded to instructions regarding earlier states, for the other half 
of the stimuli participants responded to instructions regarding later states. 
The order of blocks was counterbalanced, so that 19 of the 38 participants 
Table 1: Event States Presented in Chronological and Inverse Order (English translations are 
given in parentheses)














Note. By constructing the stimuli, we ensured that no event verb shared word forms with the 
event states
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first responded to earlier states and 19 participants first responded to later 
states.
2. Temporal order: For each instruction block 50% of the states were presented 
in chronological order, 50% in inverse order. Within each block, items were 
presented in random order.
3. SOA: Fifty percent of participants were tested with an SOA of 250 ms, 50% 
with an SOA of 1000 ms.
The dependent variables were RTs and error rates.
2.4 Procedure
The experiment was carried out using the stimuli delivery and experiment con-
trol program presentation (Version 12.1 for Windows). The experiment took place 
in a laboratory. After participants had taken their seat, they read the instruc-
tions  presented on a computer screen. The instructions described the tempo-
ral  judgement task and directed participants to answer the questions which 
would follow as accurately but as quickly as possible. The questions concerned 
were either “Which state comes earlier within the event?” or “Which state 
comes later within the event?” In the first block, participants were requested to 
answer one of the questions. When they had finished, further instructions ap-
peared in which participants were requested to answer the other question. Each 
block began with eight practice trials for which participants received feed-
back (“Correct!”, “Wrong!”). These practise trials were not included in the data 
analysis.
Presentation of each event verb was preceded by the appearance of a fixa-
tion cross in the centre of the screen (cf. Figure 2). Subsequently, the verb was 
shown, also in the centre of the screen, for either 250 ms or 1000 ms (SOA) be-
fore being replaced by an antonym pair denoting the two event states. The event 
states were presented to the left and right of the centre of the screen (the centre 
of  each being 113 mm from the mid-point of the screen). From this time on-
wards RTs were recorded. The left and right “control” keys on a standard com-
puter keyboard served as the response buttons. To indicate their response, par-
ticipants were instructed to press the response button on the side on which the 
requested state was shown. As soon as the participant had given a response, the 
antonyms disappeared and were masked for 2000 ms with series of x. A smiley on 
the screen then signalled a short pause before participants were able, at their own 
pace, to carry on by pressing one of the “control” keys. The experiment lasted 
about 20 minutes.
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2.5 Data analysis
Data pertaining to RTs and error rates was analysed using SPSS (Statistical Pack-
age for the Social Sciences, versions 11.0 and 14.0). Errors were excluded from the 
analysis of RTs. RTs that were greater or smaller than three standard deviations 
from the arithmetic mean of a participant’s RTs under each condition were re-
moved (1.6%). 
The data was analysed using a three-way mixed ANOVA (analyses of vari-
ance).4 Two factors were analysed within-subjects: instructions received (earlier 
vs. later depending on which state participants were instructed to identify) and 
temporal order of states (chronological vs. inverse depending on the order in 
which the states were presented). SOA was included as a between-subjects factor 
4 We only report subject analyses here. Since each instruction block (earlier state, later state) 
featured the same items in both temporal orders (chronological, inverse), item analyses are not 
required (Raaijmakers et al. 1999).
Fig. 2: Time course of an experimental trial. RTs were measured from onset of the antonym until 
a response was given
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(250 ms vs. 1000 ms). The level of significance was set at p < .05. Where interac-
tions related to our original hypotheses were detected, we conducted Bonferroni- 
Holm corrected t-tests (cf. Bühner and Ziegler 2009) to compare groups within 
each factor level. All analysed data sets were normally distributed.
3 Results
Table 2 shows RTs and error rates according to instruction, temporal order and 
SOA. We will first report the main effects of instructions and temporal order and 
subsequently their interaction. Finally, we will report potential moderation of the 
main effects by the SOA. 
The ANOVA yielded a main effect of instruction on RTs, F(1, 36) = 40.88, 
MSE = 93925.17, p < .001, hp2 = .53 and error rates, F(1, 36) = 11.73, MSE = .01, p < .01, 
hp2 = .25. Later states were identified significantly faster and more accurately than 
earlier states regardless of the temporal order in which the states were presented. 
The interaction between instruction and temporal order was significant for 
RTs, F(1, 36) = 8.86, MSE = 28094.46, p < .01, hp2 = .2 (cf. Figure 3) but not for error 
rates, F(1, 36) = .96, MSE = 0.02, p = .17, hp2 = .05. 
In order to find out where the interaction effect in RTs stemmed from, we 
conducted paired t-tests to compare the chronological and inverse presentation 
Table 2: Mean Reaction Times (RT, in milliseconds, ms) and Error Rates (ER) with Standard Error 
of Each Mean in Parentheses (SE) for Interaction Between Instructions Received, Temporal 
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of states for both instruction blocks (identify earlier state/identify later state) 
 separately. Chronologically presented later states (i.e., later states on the right-
hand side of the screen) were identified significantly more quickly (1340 ms) 
than  later states presented inversely (i.e., on the left-hand side of the screen; 
1459  ms), t(37) = −3.32, p < .01, r = .48. However, the order of presentation 
had no effect on the speed of identification of earlier states, t(37) = 1.05, p = .3, 
r = .17.
Further, when only chronologically presented states were considered, later 
states were identified significantly faster, t(37) = −7.3, p < .001, r = .77, and more 
accurately than earlier states, t(37) = 3.21, p < .025, r = .47. When only inversely 
presented states were considered, later states were still identified significantly 
faster than earlier states, t(37) = 4.12, p < .001, r = .64, but not significantly more 
accurately, t(37) = 1.48, p = .15, r = .24.
With regard to the interaction between instruction and SOA, the analysis re-
vealed no statistically significant effect on either RTs, F(1, 36) = 0.21, MSE = 93925.17, 
p = .65, hp2 = .01, or error rates, F(1, 36) = 0.01, MSE = −0.00007, p = .93, hp2 = .00. 
An analysis of the interaction between order of presentation and SOA did not re-
veal a significant effect on RTs, F(1, 36) = 0.00, MSE = 28104.69, p = .98, hp2 = .00 
or error rates, F(1, 36) = 1.48, MSE = 0.016, p = .23, hp2 = .04 either. Neither did an 
analysis of the three-factorial interaction between instruction, order and SOA 
Fig. 3: The graphs demonstrate the interaction between the factor “instructions received” 
(identify earlier vs. later state) and the factor “temporal order of presentation” (chronological 
vs. inverse). Each point shows mean ± 1SE
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 reveal a significant effect on RTs, F(1, 36) = 0.39, MSE = 28094.46, p = .53, hp2 = .01 
or error rates, F(1, 36) = 0.01, MSE = 0.00008, p = .93, hp2 = .00.
4 Discussion
The aim of this study was to investigate the processing of temporal information of 
events by the means of the transition from a source state to a goal state. According 
to the LASS theory of Barsalou et al. (2008), both the efficient linguistic and the 
more elaborative simulation system were assumed to be involved differently in 
the processing temporal information depending on the instruction (i.e., identify-
ing the earlier or the later state).
The study yielded the following main results. Firstly, being asked to identify 
later states led to significantly faster RTs and significantly lower error rates than 
being asked to identify earlier states regardless of the order in which the states 
were presented on the screen (chronological vs. inverse). Secondly, later states 
were identified more rapidly when they were presented in chronological order 
than when they were presented in inverse order. Thirdly, the identification of ear-
lier states was not affected by the order in which the states were presented. All 
significant effects were observed independently of the SOA.
Our results show that later states clearly enjoy a processing advantage. This 
supports the notion of the goal-directedness of cognition (Barsalou 2009; Hom-
mel et al. 2001; Prinz 1997). 
4.1 Emphasizing goals in language
According to the LASS theory (Barsalou et al. 2008), the simulation system and 
the linguistic system act together but to differing extents. There is striking evi-
dence that goal-directedness is implemented and stressed in both the linguistic 
system and the simulation system, as we will outline in the following discussion. 
The linguistic system is more efficient than the simulation system, that is, it pro-
cesses concepts at lower cognitive cost. The goal-directedness of the linguistic 
system is highlighted by features of language such as telic verbs. When a telic 
verb (e.g., to lock) is processed, a linguistic representation of the event is acti-
vated which points to the goal state. We argue that consequently, when partici-
pants were asked to identify later states, the linguistic system dominated, speed-
ing up the response process. The effectiveness of the linguistic system in 
identifying later states is illustrated by the result that later states were identified 
faster and more accurately than earlier states irrespective of the order in which 
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the two states were presented. When identifying earlier states, however, we argue 
that the simulation system is essential. Simulation is more challenging because 
sensory processes are involved, and this is reflected in the longer processing 
times observed when earlier states had to be identified. Since the advantage of 
later states emerges under both SOAs, we conclude that the goal-directedness 
 remains robust under a short and a long SOA. 
We explain the role of the linguistic system in responding to later states by 
proposing an association between event verbs and later states. The classical view 
of association is based on normative free association tasks. Association is gener-
ally deemed to a high probability of response (see also Hutchison 2003). We used 
a restricted association task to prove post-hoc association strengths between 
event verbs and later states and between event verbs and earlier states. We en-
couraged 10 participants to come up, in response to event verbs, with adjectives 
or adverbs but not nouns.5 Among the first five associations generated by each 
participant, the mean frequency of verb-goal state associations was much higher 
(0.71) than the mean frequency of verb-source state associations (0.14). This con-
firms that goals are more strongly associated with event verbs than source states 
are. The lesser association strength between event verbs and earlier states are not 
sufficient to anticipate the earlier state only linguistically. 
Please note that we do not distinguish between linguistic association and 
semantic content as Barsalou et al. (2008: 251) do. According to Barsalou et al., 
“language per se cannot represent a concept” (p. 266), which implies that the 
simulation system is the only one to take account of semantic content. We pro-
pose instead that associations processed in the linguistic system are based on 
semantics. They are linguistically mirrored co-occurrences of things and proper-
ties in real life (e.g., broom-floor, canary-yellow). Hence, language does encode 
real relationships between things (cf. Louwerse 2007). This is indicated by a study 
by Prior and Bentin (2008) who demonstrated that associations between words 
were only learned when they were embedded in coherent sentences and not when 
they were embedded in semantically non-sense sentences, showing that pure co- 
occurrences of words do not suffice to build associations. Consequently, the goal 
states we obtained in our restricted association task are assumed to be related to 
the semantic content of event verbs and, thus, cannot be seen as associations 
without semantic content.6
5 In normative free association tasks, nouns are most frequently associated with verbs and only 
rarely are state-denoting adjectives or adverbs obtained (Nuthmann and van der Meer 2005; Stru-
be 1984). For this reason we used a restricted association task here. 
6 For a more elaborate investigation of the role of association in event knowledge, see Hare et al. 
(2009).
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Similarly, very recent studies attempt to reconcile embodied and linguistic 
accounts of the representation of semantic content (Andrews et al. in press; 
Borghi and Cimatti 2012) and outline how words function as “tools” (Borghi and 
Cimatti 2012) for accessing meaning both through their linguistic relationship to 
other words and their embodied grounding in experience. 
4.2 Goal-biased simulation
We expected the order in which the antonymous adjectives or adverbs were pre-
sented to have an effect on RTs and accuracy, especially where participants had 
been instructed to identify earlier states. Contrary to our expectations, however, 
the order effect was only present in connection with later states. Later states pre-
sented in chronological order were identified more rapidly than later states pre-
sented in inverse order (remember that a temporal order impact cannot be at-
tributed to directed associations between the antonymous adjectives, see Note 2). 
We attribute this effect to the efficiency achieved when linguistic and simulation 
processing are combined. Though the linguistic system peaks first when later 
states have to be identified, the simulation system is not inactive but ready to kick 
in subsequently (see Barsalou et al. 2008: 248). This dual processing speeds up 
the identification of chronologically presented later states compared to inversely 
presented later states. 
Goal-directedness is a phenomenon that fundamentally influences the per-
ception and memorization of events (e.g., Barsalou and Sewell 1985; Hommel 
et al. 2001; Klein et al. 2010; Kurby and Zacks 2008; Zacks et al. 2001), so it would 
be surprising if it were not present in simulation. Selective attention is focused on 
schematic components of perceptual experiences that become part of the long-
term memory, meaning that simulations themselves are “always partial and 
sketchy, never complete” (Barsalou 1999: 586). Thus, events are generally simu-
lated focussing on goals because this is the important aspect for cognition. 
The question remains, however, of why earlier states presented in chronolog-
ical order were not identified more rapidly than earlier states presented in inverse 
order. This seemingly paradoxical result we too attribute to the fact that during 
simulation processing, attention is biased to goal states, subjecting source states 
to a general processing disadvantage even when they are presented chronologi-
cally. Because simulation processing is goal-biased, perception in our experiment 
is directed towards the right-hand side of the computer screen where the goal of 
an event is expected to be, irrespective of whether the state in question is the 
earlier or the later state. This expectation is fed by the correlation between later 
states that are goals and the right side of the screen in iconic chronological order. 
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The attentional bias to the right is indicated by significant shorter RTs to states 
presented on the right than to states presented on the left, not only for later states, 
but irrespective of the state in question, t(37) = 2.81, p < .01, r = 42. 
The goal-bias is also reflected in the higher error rate generally observed 
when participants were asked to identify earlier states. Only after the goal state 
has been detected can the earlier state be inferred on the basis of that goal. In line 
with this conclusion, Lichtenstein and Brewer (1980) found evidence that to re-
trieve temporal information, people work back from the goal to the sub-goals that 
constitute the “preconditions” (i.e., the source states) of superordinate goals in a 
hierarchical order (p. 428).
Our evidence that the goals or end states of events are emphasized in percep-
tion as well as in language is supported by a study by Regier and Zheng (2007), 
who asked participants to judge whether two events shown in video clips were 
the same. The events presented either emphasized the beginning (e.g., taking a 
cap off a pen) or the end of an event (e.g., putting a cap on a pen). Participants 
made fewer errors when judging the ends of events than when judging the be-
ginning of events, indicating that people particularly focus their attention on 
event endpoints (p. 709). Regier and Zheng (2007) also found an attentional bias 
to the ends of events in language. When participants were asked to describe 
events, finer semantic distinctions were made at event endpoints than at event 
beginnings. 
In a nutshell, we assume that goal-directedness is found in both the simula-
tion system and the language processing system. It features in the simulation sys-
tem because it is a fundamental principle of survival, and is retained for the same 
reason in a more abstract form in the linguistic system.
5 Conclusion
During an event, the states of persons and objects change. We used this as a 
means of investigating the way in which events are represented mentally. On the 
basis of a temporal judgement task, we showed that earlier (source) states and 
later (goal) states are not represented and accessed in the same way.
The explanation for our results lies in the interplay between the simulation 
system and the linguistic system (see the LASS theory; Barsalou et al. 2008). In 
accordance with Barsalou (2009) and Hommel et al. (2001), we showed that 
goal-directedness is both a guiding principle of cognition and one which explains 
how events are represented. Goal-directedness (i.e., directedness towards later 
states) is represented by both systems. However, the linguistic system provides 
faster and more direct access to goals and later states, making it easier to identify 
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later states than earlier ones in both orders in which the two are presented. The 
influence of the simulation system means that later states presented chronologi-
cally are processed faster than later states presented inversely. Responses to ear-
lier, source states are always delayed, less accurate and not facilitated by chrono-
logical presentation because simulation itself is goal-directed and attention is 
biased towards the goal at the end. Before the source state can be identified, then, 
goal-directedness has to be overcome.
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Appendix
German Version English Translation 
Event Antonym 1 Antonym 2 Event Antonym 1 Antonym 2
abschmecken ungenießbar bekömmlich to taste inedible digestible
verfaulen bekömmlich ungenießbar to go 
mouldy
digestible inedible
festschrauben wackelig stabil to screw unstable stable
lockern stabil wackelig to loosen stable unstable
auskurieren krank gesund to cure ill healthy
infizieren gesund krank to infect healthy ill
aufrichten waagerecht senkrecht to erect horizontal vertical
umkippen senkrecht waagerecht to capsize vertical horizontal
beschädigen heil defekt to damage intact broken
reparieren defekt heil to repair broken intact
anpassen verschieden gleich to match different same
verändern gleich verschieden to alter same different
erhöhen billig teuer to increase cheap expensive
ermäßigen teuer billig to reduce expensive cheap
zerschmelzen gefroren abgetaut to melt frozen thawed
erkalten abgetaut gefroren to cool thawed frozen
zurückkommen dort hier to return there here
auswandern hier dort to emigrate here there
erweitern schmal breit to enlarge narrow broad
einengen breit schmal to narrow broad narrow
entwirren komplex einfach to
disentangle
complex simple
zusammensetzen einfach komplex to compose simple complex
komplizieren leicht schwer to
complicate
easy difficult
unterstützen schwer leicht to assist difficult easy
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German Version English Translation 
Event Antonym 1 Antonym 2 Event Antonym 1 Antonym 2
entzweien auseinander zusammen to divide joined separate 
vereinen zusammen auseinander to join separate joined
auszehren fett mager to become
emaciated
fat skinny
zunehmen mager fett to gain 
weight
skinny fat
gebären innen außen to give birth inside outside
eintreten außen innen to enter outside inside
anzünden erloschen brennend to inflame extinguished burning
ausglühen brennend erloschen to cease 
glowing
burning extinguished
verschließen auf zu to close open closed
öffnen zu auf to open closed open
ausstrecken kurz lang to extend short long
abschneiden lang kurz to cut long short
absteigen oben unten to dismount up down
klettern unten oben to climb down up
verpatzen gründlich oberflächlich to mess up thorough perfunctory
intensivieren oberflächlich gründlich to intensify perfunctory thorough
beschützen riskant sicher to protect risky safe
pokern sicher riskant to gamble safe risky
entfernen erfasst unregistriert to delete recorded unregistered
speichern unregistriert erfasst to record unregistered recorded
verelenden reich arm to pauperize rich poor
erben arm reich to inherit poor rich
aufbrausen heftig sachte to erupt gentle fierce
abklingen sachte heftig to decay fierce gentle
aufknöpfen angezogen entkleidet to unbutton dressed undressed
bedecken entkleidet angezogen to cover undressed dressed
heimkehren fern nah to come
home
far near
wegfahren nah fern to leave near far
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German Version English Translation 
Event Antonym 1 Antonym 2 Event Antonym 1 Antonym 2
einsperren außerhalb innerhalb to imprision outside inside
verlassen innerhalb außerhalb to exit inside ouside
verraten geheim öffentlich to betray sectret public








zerlegt montiert to assemble fragmented assembled
ausklingen laut leise to fade away loud quiet
verstärken leise laut to amplify quiet loud
abtauchen oberhalb unterhalb to descend above underneath
aufsteigen unterhalb oberhalb to ascend underneath above
